Understanding the Inner Workings of a State-Space Foundation Model for Limit Order Books
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PAPER / ARXIV:2610.30891
Matteo Onger, Luigi Foscari
RESUMO
We propose a market-making game played among N>=2 strategic market makers and a single non-strategic representative trader. In a continuous quote space, standard finite-game arguments do not apply, while non-convex and discontinuous payoffs rule out classical continuous existence results and complicate learning. Nonetheless, we characterize pure-strategy Nash equilibria (PSNEs) and show that at least one PSNE always exists under minimal assumptions on the underlying asset value distribution, and that the equilibrium bid-ask spread widens strictly with asset value volatility. To obtain a tractable learning framework, we discretize prices and show that the time-averaged play of no-internal-regret learners approaches the continuous Nash price envelope as the tick size vanishes.
NO MESMO MAPA
Resumo indisponível. Consulte o paper original.
Resumo indisponível. Consulte o paper original.
Resumo indisponível. Consulte o paper original.
Resumo indisponível. Consulte o paper original.
Resumo indisponível. Consulte o paper original.