Conference Design for Consensus under KL Acceptance
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PAPER / ARXIV:2610.14225
Panagiotis Kyriazis
RESUMO
How should consumers learn when a seller chooses a menu of product qualities and prices? We study information design when the seller observes the learning policy, but not consumers' private signals, before choosing its menu. Under cost-curvature conditions, we characterize optimal learning when consumer surplus receives greater weight than profit. Even with two valuations, every optimal posterior distribution combines an interval of posterior types with an efficiently served atom at the highest valuation. The induced menu features a continuum of differentiated products. Strikingly, optimal learning can also induce a lower posterior atom, separated from this interval by a support gap. Buyers in this atom either purchase an isolated low-quality product or are excluded, even when trade with every buyer creates gains. We also characterize the optimal joint design of learning and valuation-dependent segmentation. Additional price discrimination can therefore benefit consumers, even when privacy restrictions require segmentation to reveal nothing about valuations to the seller.
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Resumo indisponível. Consulte o paper original.
Resumo indisponível. Consulte o paper original.
Resumo indisponível. Consulte o paper original.
Resumo indisponível. Consulte o paper original.
Resumo indisponível. Consulte o paper original.
Resumo indisponível. Consulte o paper original.