Repeat-After-Me: Black-Box Adaptive Visual Prompt Injection

RESUMO

Prompt injection is widely recognized as a major security threat to AI agents that interact with untrusted external data, such as websites, documents, and emails. Prior work has shown that, in the text domain, black-box prompt injection can achieve near-perfect attack success rates (ASRs). In the image domain, however, existing visual prompt injection methods are substantially less effective in attacking frontier commercial VLMs for materially harmful behavior. Achieving such outputs is hard because it requires a long and/or format-compliant target string, such as a precise, parseable native tool call with exact function names and arguments. We present Repeat-After-Me, a black-box adaptive visual prompt injection attack that can reveal personally identifiable information or make malicious tool calls. Across both open-weight and commercial frontier VLMs, including Qwen3.6-27B and GPT-5.5, our method achieves ASRs exceeding 82% and 47%, respectively, under a realistic setting in which the benign user prompt is semantically unrelated to the injected task and does not verbally authorize it. Our optimized injection has non-trivial attack transferability across commercial VLMs and benign samples. We show our attack works in cases where adaptive textual prompt injection fails. In a real-world OpenClaw agent connected to Discord, an untrusted user can use a minimally injected image from our attack to overwrite this http URL , enabling future sensitive behaviors like remote code execution and secret exfiltration. We discuss potential defenses.